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ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the
determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article
6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to
operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of
additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing
under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still
necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to
prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’
generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an
independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country
does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by
the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests
of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment
analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be
differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest
calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation
generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed
additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding
a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs
to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country
categories and rise over time.
Key policy insights
. Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements
might lead to an international diffusion of ‘hot air’. To avoid this, an
independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under
the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.
. Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience
developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
. Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid
cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly
aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds
for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by
carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should
increase.
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1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016b) has brought about a sea change in global climate governance. Two
aspects are particularly important. Firstly, achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, in particular
the well below 2°C limit (Article 2.1a) and the goal to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality in the second half of
this century (Article 4.1), will require a fundamental transformation of our economies and societies (Hermwille,
2016; Kinley, 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2018; Obergassel et al., 2016). Secondly, the Paris Agreement is universal,
without a fundamental legal differentiation between developed and developing countries. All countries alike
have an obligation to develop and communicate increasingly more ambitious Nationally Determined Contri-
butions (NDCs) for mitigation. While there is no legal obligation to actually achieve the mitigation goals
defined by the NDCs, countries are obliged to ‘pursue domestic mitigation measures’, with the aim of achieving
their NDC objectives (Article 4.2).
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables Parties to cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs in order to
‘allow for higher ambition (…) and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity’ (Article
6.1). It does so by specifying two avenues:
. Article 6.4 establishes a new mechanism ‘to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and
support sustainable development’. This mechanism will be subject to international oversight and, at the
time of writing, formal modalities and procedures are being negotiated.
. Article 6.2 allows countries to voluntarily engage in ‘cooperative approaches that involve the use of interna-
tionally transferred mitigation outcomes [ITMOs] towards nationally determined contributions’. While a set of
guidelines is being developed at the time of writing, Article 6.2 envisages no formal international oversight.
While such market-based mechanisms can be effective mitigation instruments, they can also threaten the
integrity and efficacy of global climate action if used inappropriately.
Additionality has become a key concept in order to ensure that inappropriate use is avoided or at least mini-
mized. In a nutshell, the concept requires any mitigation activity that is considered for a market-based mech-
anism to demonstrate that the corresponding emission reductions would not have happened in the absence
of the support from the market-based mechanism. Additionality is key to ensuring that no fictitious carbon
units, i.e. units that do not represent real emission reductions, compromise global carbon markets. If countries
or any other entity use such units to comply with their mitigation obligations (offsetting), this would result in an
overall increase of emissions instead of a reduction. Additionality is hence a safeguard for environmental integ-
rity. While the mechanisms established by Articles 6.2 and 6.4 differ substantially from each other, the require-
ment for environmental integrity mandated by Article 6.1 applies to all mechanisms under Article 6.
The aim of this article is to develop recommendations for how additionality can best be ensured under the
new framework conditions established by the Paris Agreement. We take into consideration earlier work by
Fuessler, Herren, Kollmuss, Lazarus, and Schneider (2014) who discuss the link between stringency of NDCs
and baseline setting as well as additionality determination on a ‘micro’ basis, and go beyond Schneider and
La Hoz Theuer (2019), who discuss generic approaches for ensuring environmental integrity under Article 6,
but do not provide concrete recommendations on additionality determination. Our paper should be seen as
companion to Müller and Michaelowa (2019) who discuss accounting under Article 6, La Hoz Theuer, Schneider,
and Broekhoff (2019) who propose to address the risk of ‘hot air’ transfers through limits to international trans-
fers (which we think can be avoided by credible additionality testing), and Spalding-Fecher, Sammut, Broekhoff,
and Füssler (2017) who were the first to address methodological details regarding crediting of policy
instruments.
One key difference between Paris Agreement Article 6 and the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol is that
projects/programmes under the latter did not have to take into account new national mitigation policies invol-
ving financial support for their additionality determination (UNFCCC, 2010a, 2010b).1 The dynamic nature of the
Paris Agreement, however, and the mandate to increase ambition over time, suggest that this practice cannot
continue.
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The article will therefore first take a step back and review generic definitions of additionality (Section 2).
Section 3 asks what can be considered an appropriate baseline against which to determine additionality. The
NDCs are a natural starting point, but as we shall demonstrate there are severe limitations to this approach. Sub-
sequently, in Section 4, we propose a stepwise procedure for assessing whether additionality needs to be tested,
or whether the NDC is seen as going beyond ‘business as usual’. Section 5 discusses how a robust business as
usual determination at the national level could look like. Section 6 finally operationalizes various approaches for
additionality demonstration at different scales of action – projects, programmes and different types of policies.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Generic definition of additionality
2.1. The core concept of additionality
The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘additional’ as ‘added, extra, or supplementary to what is already present or avail-
able.’ No common understanding of the precise meaning of additionality and how it can be implemented most
effectively has yet been achieved in the climate change and development communities despite over two
decades of debate. There is a wide body of literature discussing additionality (see e.g. Gillenwater, 2012 and
Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2019 for an overview) which we will draw upon regarding specific conceptual issues.
At a basic conceptual level ‘additionality is about assessing causation. It is about deciding if a proposed
activity is being caused to happen by a policy intervention’ (Gillenwater, 2012, p. 3). Looking at a basic definition,
a cause ‘is the sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together…which being realized, the con-
sequent invariably follows’ (Mill cited in Davidson, 1967, p. 692). However, when assessing additionality in the
context of market-based mitigation, it is impractical to take into account ‘the sum total’ of potentially infinite
necessary conditions, even the most circumstantial ones. Instead, assessing additionality requires identifying
unmet necessary conditions which by means of the respective policy intervention will be resolved. This requires
assessing (1) whether the respective policy intervention in principle addresses the unmet condition and (2)
whether it is fit to resolve the deficit.
At the root of this is a fundamental dilemma. The first component of this dilemma is to identify unmet con-
ditions. The larger the deficit, the easier it is to identify with confidence an unmet condition. However, the larger
the deficit, the more powerful a policy intervention must be to be able to make a significant contribution to
remedying the same deficit. The same is true vice-versa: in cases where a condition is just short of being
met, it is fairly easy to demonstrate that the policy intervention can actually contribute to crossing the threshold.
However, given that there is typically no clearly defined threshold, it may be challenging to determine whether
the condition is actually met or unmet in the first place. This is compounded by the general problem of the
unobservable counterfactual and multiple factors influencing human behaviour (Gillenwater, 2012).
2.2. Additionality in practice
We now move from the conceptual to the practical level of additionality assessments. Of particular interest are
approaches that look at the properties of an individual project and assess whether the project’s output is
additional. In order to assess such ‘project additionality’, a baseline scenario (also called a business-as-usual
(BAU) scenario or reference scenario) and a project scenario need to be developed. Key aspects of ‘project addi-
tionality’ are related to the financial elements. Investment additionality, for example, is deemed to be satisfied if
the profitability of a climate project is lower than in the BAU case or when it is lower than a pre-defined hurdle
rate (e.g. with regard to internal rate of return or payback period) (Greiner & Michaelowa, 2003). An alternative,
standardized approach to project additionality is to check whether the technology is not used to a significant
degree in the BAU case (World Bank et al., 2004). Here, standardized parameters such as market penetration rate
thresholds have been proposed (Kartha, Lazarus, & LeFranc, 2005) and later used under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM).
An early literature review of baselines and various approaches for selecting the right baseline scenario is pro-
vided by Michaelowa and Fages (1999) and Gustavsson et al. (2000). Additionality in relation to a single econ-
omically rational investor is analysed by Bode and Michaelowa (2003). Gillenwater (2012) highlights that reliance
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on expert judgments for additionality assessments is not inherently problematic if judgment biases are handled
appropriately. What is clearly problematic are unclear and disputed definitions of additionality and baselines, as
biased private assumptions will then flow into the assessments.
As project developers have an incentive to game the parameters in order to gain more emission units
(Michaelowa, 1998a), testing of ‘project additionality’ is generally difficult. Although the different investment-
related additionality tests discussed above are labour- and cost-intensive, they are more accurate than the
barrier tests that were used in the early days of the CDM, where project developers described qualitatively
which barriers would prevent the implementation of their activities (SEI, 2011).
All these concepts were combined in the additionality test procedures under the CDM where, for large pro-
jects, investment testing was the method of choice after initial problems with barrier testing. Attempts to intro-
duce performance benchmarks as a replacement for investment testing stalled as it became clear that such
benchmarks can only be applied in very homogeneous (sub)-sectors. In the last years, for small-scale projects,
more and more standardized approaches (such as positive lists of project types automatically deemed as
additional) have emerged. However, positive lists –which are also used widely on the voluntary carbonmarkets –
are a very crude instrument that cannot convincingly check additionality of technologies whose economic
attractiveness can differ significantly. For example, despite the recent cost decrease of solar PV, which makes
it the lowest cost power generation option under many circumstances, the CDM Executive Board could not
agree to remove it from the positive list.
Recently, the new concepts of ‘paradigm shift’ and ‘transformational change’ have emerged (Boodoo, Mers-
mann, & Olsen, 2018; Mersmann & Wehnert, 2015; Olsen & Fenhann, 2015), posing additional challenges to the
concept of additionality. The questions implied in additionality are: What is BAU? And how does the proposed
activity go beyond BAU? Whereas the questions to ask to assess transformational change are: What ought to
become BAU? And how can the project/activity help get us there? In that sense assessing the transformational
potential of a proposed activity tries to assess whether it serves as a leg-up to a transformational development
pathway. Potentially, this kind of thinking could complement or even substitute additionality demonstration.
However, operationalizing the transformational change criterion has proved to be challenging (see for
example ICAT, 2017).
3. The trouble with NDCs
A key challenge under the new Paris Agreement framework is that the determination of whether or not activities
are additional will need to take into account existing and new mitigation efforts of the host countries. The term
‘baseline’ is of central interest here. However, the term can refer to three different but potentially overlapping
concepts which must not be confused: Firstly, in the context of additionality determination for credited activi-
ties, ‘baseline’ refers to a reference scenario against which additionality of the activity is assessed. In relation to
the definition of additionality cited in Section 2.1, the baseline represents ‘what is already present or available’;
Secondly, many market-based mitigation instruments also require a crediting baseline or baseline emissions to
determine the amount of emission reductions or avoided emissions. This crediting baseline may not necessarily
be identical to the reference scenario applied for additionality determination; Finally, ‘baseline’ may refer to
country-level or sectoral BAU emission projections used in the context of an NDC, and not related to a
specific activity.
Historically, a project-specific BAU scenario has often been used as an activity baseline. However, under the
Paris Agreement, all parties are obliged to develop NDCs and to increase the level of ambition over time (Article
4.3). Using BAU as baseline is hardly compatible with the requirement to increase ambition. This section explores
what alternatives may exist.
The first reference point for exploring this issue is the countries’ NDC targets. But in many cases, using the
NDC targets and corresponding policies and measures as a reference level for additionality determination
cannot be considered sufficient for both practical and political reasons. The first round of (intended) NDCs pre-
pared in the run-up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in 2015 in Paris displays a great diversity in
terms of the types of mitigation contributions/targets, time frames and reference years included, and essentially
every aspect of these (UNFCCC, 2016a). At the previous COP 20 in Lima in 2014, negotiations on a common
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format and information requirements for (i)NDCs had failed (Ott et al., 2014). The resulting disparate structure
with very different types of mitigation pledges – ranging from economy-wide, absolute multi-year emission
budgets to lists of sub-sectoral activities whose outcomes are not framed in GHG-related terms – and the result-
ing lack of clarity and comparability of NDCs makes for a difficult assessment of what is ‘extra’ and what is not.
This remains the case after the decisions taken at COP 24 in Katowice in 2018 on the ‘Paris Rulebook’.
The level of ambition is an even more fundamental problem. If one applied the approach used by Joint
Implementation (JI) under the Kyoto Protocol, the NDC emission target defines the emissions level from
which emissions credits are deducted, assumed to be below the country-level BAU. There is no direct link
between the emissions level of the NDC and the micro-level baseline for creation of emissions credits by an
activity. In theory, project-level additionality demonstration could be waived, as no government would have
an incentive to sell non-additional mitigation. It is important to stress that, in this case, crediting of non-
additional activities would not lead to an increase of global emissions. However, if BAU emission projections
of NDCs are overestimated, that is, a higher than realistic level of emissions is assumed (intentionally or not)
and the NDC target is less ambitious than the ‘real’ BAU, global emissions would increase through crediting
of non-additional activities. This risk is real, as shown during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
Here, in the case of JI, the economic downturn and corresponding reduction of emissions experienced by the
states of the former Soviet Union led to huge amounts of ‘hot air’2 compared to the former BAU projection. Koll-
muss, Schneider, and Zhezherin (2015) conclude that the environmental integrity of 80% of emission reduction
units issued under JI is questionable, and that JI may consequently have enabled global greenhouse gas emis-
sions to be about 600 million tCO2e higher than they would have otherwise been. The ‘hot air’ issue has resur-
faced also under the Paris Agreement. Schneider et al. (2017) found that the current round of NDCs contain a
considerable potential of 2.2–3.5 Gt CO2eq of ‘hot air’, mainly by BAU overestimation and targets that are less
stringent than the real BAU. However, ambitious NDCs also exist so the critical question is to differentiate
between ‘hot air’ generating NDCs and ambitious ones.
Many NDCs put forward by developing countries include an unconditional component (to be met with dom-
estic resources) and a more ambitious, conditional one (requiring support through international finance). An
important question now is whether the more stringent conditional NDC target, or the less stringent uncondi-
tional one, should be used as baseline. Should this depend on the actual availability of international climate
finance? The problem is that this will only be known ex post, and thus such a rule could not be applied ex
ante. What is the situation for those countries where support is explicitly expected to be generated and chan-
nelled through market-based cooperative climate action (Obergassel & Gornik, 2015)? This again suggests that
the unconditional target should represent the baseline. However, no easy solution is in sight for those countries
that did not indicate what part of the NDC is supposed to be achieved unconditionally and which part may be
contingent on financial flows from developed countries. In such cases, it might be possible to consider the actual
policies and measures implemented in the context of the NDC as the baseline, i.e. the emissions level that will
(likely) be achieved with those policies and measures. It might be argued that the actual emission levels can only
be determined ex-post, but of course reasonable estimates could be applied, including sensitivity analysis for
key parameters. However, this might be considered unfair given that the level of ambition of NDCs varies sig-
nificantly (see discussion above).
Given that the first round of NDCs falls far short of the ambition set out in Article 4.3 – a point explicitly ‘noted
with concern’ in the decision adopting the Paris Agreement (Fawcett et al., 2015; UNFCCC, 2016c, para. 17, see
also 2016a) – it could be argued that project-level additionality testing should only be waived if NDC targets are
consistent with a well below 2°C or even 1.5°C pathway. While this may be theoretically compelling, it is meth-
odologically challenging. Who is to determine what such a pathway should look like? It is also politically challen-
ging, because NDCs are deliberately and explicitly nationally determined. It is hardly plausible that Parties would
accept an independent assessment, a top-down imposed benchmark that goes beyond what they have deter-
mined for themselves as a sovereign nation. What is more, a 2°C – let alone a 1.5°C – pathway would most likely
be so aggressive and ambitious that there is virtually no mitigation potential left that could be transferred to
another country. The most stringent macro baseline against which to assess additionality is a country’s
‘highest possible ambition’, as required by the Paris Agreement (Article 4.3). Narrowly interpreted, it would
mean that there is nothing that is additional. However, this seems neither realistic nor practical, especially
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given that the interpretation of ‘highest possible’ may have many shades and depend on the country-specific
political economy of climate change mitigation (Figure 1).
A further problem is that only a minority of countries have expressed their NDC targets encompassing all
sectors and all GHGs. Approximately 6.1 Gt CO2eq corresponding to 12–14% of projected emissions in 2030
are not covered by targets under current NDCs (Schneider et al., 2017).
These emission sources are principally outside of the Paris mitigation system and – like for developing
countries under the Kyoto Protocol – there is no inherent incentive for host countries to ensure the additionality
of activities. The additionality of emission credits or ITMOs from mitigation in sectors not covered by NDCs
should therefore be ensured by testing at the activity level.
The situation gets more complex if and when non-covered sectors are brought ‘under’ an NDC through
future revisions of NDCs. This would lead to a situation where the seller country needs to decide whether to
continue selling the credits or to use the mitigation to reach the NDC target. This situation would lead to a
loss of revenue for the seller country, and therefore it has been argued that it provides a negative incentive
to expand the NDC coverage.
4. A stepwise procedure for additionality testing depending on NDC ambition
Despite the difficulties with using NDCs as reference for additionality determination, there is probably no way
around doing so. NDCs are fundamental to the Paris Agreement. Any approach for additionality determination
has to find a pragmatic approach to deal with NDCs and their deficiencies. Following the discussion in Section 3,
it can be argued that either NDCs must be tested for the adequacy of their baseline definition and ambition
level, or additionality-testing must be conducted for all activities individually.
However, additionality testing at the activity level is often technically challenging and associated with high
transaction costs. Under which circumstances could such testing be waived? In this section a generic, stepwise
decision-making procedure (see Figure 2 below) is proposed, followed by consideration of the central element
of the procedure, namely, centralized additionality testing.
The first step of the procedure assesses whether the activity is covered by the NDC or not. If this is the case, the
first precondition for a waiver of additionality testing is fulfilled, but then further conditions need to be checked
that are related to the ‘hot air’ risk. The second condition is that there is an external check of the realism of BAU
estimation and a frequent update of this estimate. If this condition is fulfilled, the final check looks at whether the
NDC contains ‘hot air’, or not. Only if the latter is confirmed, can additionality testing be waived.
We now look at each of the steps in detail.
Figure 1. Illustration of various potential reference levels for additionality determination.
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As discussed in Section 3 above, the additionality of emission reductions that are outside of the Paris mitiga-
tion system should be assessed at the activity level. Therefore, we need to check whether the activity’s emissions
are within the scope of the NDC target. Depending on the degree of international oversight, Article 6.2 and 6.4
activities may have to be treated differently.
If Article 6.2 is devoid of international oversight, the risk of governments agreeing on a transfer of non-
additional units is very high, as shown by the experience from JI highlighted above. Thus, we recommend
that activities in sectors outside of NDCs not be eligible under Article 6.2.
Article 6.4 activities will be subject to international oversight in a way similar to the CDM, raising the possibility
of mandating stringent additionality rules for activities outside NDCs, as further laid out below. It should be noted
that international oversight does not necessarily guarantee environmental integrity. There is a substantial body of
research that finds that the additionality of many projects approved under the CDM is questionable, despite its
extensive system of international oversight (see e.g. Schneider, 2009; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012). Still, inter-
national oversight at least increases the chance of ensuring a minimum level of quality. The further development
of the Article 6 rules provides an opportunity to learn from the experiences of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
Given the risk of ‘hot air’ transfers, a system of external reviews of BAU emission projections and NDC ambi-
tion by an international body should be established. We propose a new ‘Article 6 Supervisory Board’ (A6SB) that
would be reporting to the Parties of the Paris Agreement. This can be done either for the entire NDC scope or for
specific sectors depending on the scope of, and information contained in, the NDC.
If a country agrees to such an external review and the review finds that the NDC generates ‘hot air’, we
suggest that activity-specific additionality testing (see Section 5) is required. If projected NDC emissions are
lower or, at most, as high, as projected BAU emissions, then the need for additionality testing at the international
level might be waived as the country would have an incentive to allow only exports of actual emission
reductions. Even if an activity is not additional, the host country would still have to compensate for this by
making corresponding adjustments to its own emissions accounting, thereby ensuring integrity. If a country
refuses the external review, then for any Article 6.2 and 6.4 action, we consider that an activity-specific addition-
ality test is inevitable for safeguarding the mechanisms’ integrity. Such activity-specific additionality testing will
Figure 2. Decision making tree for additionality testing of Article 6.2 and 6.4 activities. *A6SB = Article 6 Supervisory Body (see section below).
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be dealt with in Section 6. We now discuss the key challenges encountered in BAU determination and ways to
address them.
5. Challenges in BAU determination and how to deal with them
Defining BAU at the country level could make use of economic/energy modelling, which has been routinely
done in the past. The problem is that BAU forecasts strongly depend on the assumptions used and have
often proven remarkably off the mark, especially if they cover long time periods. This is due to unforeseen
changes in technology that influence prices of different fuels and types of energy, shifting shares of economic
sectors in the total economy, as well as unexpected economic crises. The former is illustrated nicely through the
unexpected reduction in costs of solar photovoltaics, which have made that technology competitive much
earlier than expected only a few years ago. The latter is illustrated by the financial and economic crisis of
2008, which led to much lower levels of industrial production for a number of years than projected before
2008. This wreaked havoc in the EU emissions trading scheme because the allocation of allowances had
been made on the basis of the pre-2008 forecasts, and thus the system became heavily overallocated.
Simplified approaches for country-level BAU determination proposed in the past (see the discussion in
Danish Energy Agency et al., 2013) include:
. Extrapolation of historical emissions trends. This approach suffers from its inability to consider surprises (see
discussion in the preceding paragraph). It would thus be appropriate in the short, but not the long term, and
only until a ‘surprise’ has manifested itself;
. Use of benchmarks (e.g. t CO2e/USD GDP) that can initially be derived through economic modelling as well as
technology-specific studies (Holz, Kartha, & Athanasiou, 2018). This suffers from the challenge of disaggrega-
tion. A unique benchmark for all countries cannot take into account differences in country factor endow-
ments, renewable energy potential, economic structure etc. Taking each country’s unique situation into
account would lead to a country-specific benchmark, which would require country-specific studies and,
hence, time, resources and effort.
A possible solution to the challenge of the increasing inaccuracy of BAU forecasts over longer periods of time
is to apply a ‘dynamic’ baseline approach, where the formula to calculate BAU emissions projections is defined
ex-ante, but the parameters that enter the calculation are only quantified ex-post. We suggest testing dynamic
baselines during the first revision of the NDCs. Alternatively, country-level BAU estimates should be frequently
revised – e.g. at least every two years. If the dynamic baseline shifted in a way that ‘hot air’ could be generated
after the shift, it would mean that additionality testing would have to be undertaken for activities that previously
had been exempt.
To bring in an additional layer of complexity, it is necessary to decide whether BAU forecasts are done at a
national level or at a sectoral level. Ideally, the calculation of the BAU emission baselines for each sector that will
host an Article 6.2 or 6.4 activity would be done in a centralized manner, using the same methodology and
approach. Hence, if a Party (voluntarily) made use of Article 6.2 or 6.4, it would (voluntarily) make a request
to the A6SB to define its BAU emissions according to a standard methodology. The same standard methodology
should ideally be applied to all countries that plan to apply Article 6.2 and 6.4 in that sector, and it should apply
as many common parameters (e.g. country-specific population growth, GDP data, emissions intensity factors) as
possible.
This centralization of the determination of NDC baseline levels would build on experiences with CDM rules,
and would create more trust among all countries that the results are not biased. Determining whether a country’s
NDC includes ‘hot air’ implies a judgement of its level of ambition and might therefore be politically sensitive.
6. Additionality tests for different scales of activities
If additionality needs to be determined at the policy/activity level due to the outcome of the stepwise assess-
ment procedure described in Section 4, the approach to be taken is strongly dependent on the scale of an
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intervention, which can take the form of a specific project, a programme of activities or a policy instrument. This
section discusses various approaches for the different scales.
6.1. Project-based activities and programmes
For project-based activities and programmes, over ten years of experience have been gathered with the Kyoto
Protocol Mechanisms. While there is a lot to learn from this experience, there are also limits to the applicability of
the tried and tested approaches in the new legal framework of the Paris Agreement, in particular the need to
take into account existing and new mitigation policies of the host countries, including NDCs. Also, recent devel-
opments have proven the limitations of the existing methods. For example, given the rapid increases in attrac-
tiveness of low-carbon technologies, e.g. photovoltaic and wind power plants, doubts have been raised about
the additionality of related projects (Cames et al., 2016). Improved additionality tests on the project and pro-
gramme level should therefore better capture such highly dynamic developments. We suggest that a thorough
investment test with standardization of input parameters should be mandatory for all projects and programmes
except the very smallest ones.
6.2. Policy instruments
Under the CDM and de facto also under JI, national policy instruments were not eligible for generating emission
credits. This may change now under Article 6. With regard to crediting of government policies there is wide-
spread consensus that attributing causality to government policies is highly complex because many different
factors – such as social trends, high-level policies and macroeconomics – can influence the programme out-
comes (House, 2001; Mayne, 2001; Mohr, 1999; White, 2010). In order to assess the effects attributable solely
to the policy instrument itself, it is therefore crucial to find appropriate ways to determine causality (Davidson,
2000). The World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness (2017) discusses generic approaches for setting sec-
toral or national-level baselines but does not assess policy additionality. If countries are not willing to prevent
‘hot air’ generation and thus do not agree on dynamic baselines or frequent updates of BAU projections (at least
every 2 years) with standardized procedures as proposed above, the only other option to ensure environmental
integrity is to implement policy-specific additionality tests.
We classify policy instruments into the categories of regulation, carbon pricing and direct financial support
(e.g. feed-in tariffs or subsidies). There are also other categories of instruments relating to research, information
and know-how transfer. However, the impacts of such ‘soft’ instruments are particularly difficult to assess and
will therefore not be further discussed here. For each of the three main categories, we discuss potential inroads
to additionality testing. The key criteria applied here are the costs of the mitigation measures triggered by the
policies, which can be carried either by the mitigating entities (in the case of regulation or carbon taxes/emis-
sions trading) or by the government budget (in the case of subsidies), and the political economy of the intro-
duction of a policy instrument.
In principle, non-monetary co-benefits of the policies are also relevant. Policies can make political sense even
in the absence of climate change concerns as they generate sustainable development co-benefits, such as
improved health due to lowered air, water and soil pollution. For example, in China a main reason for introduc-
tion of an emission trading scheme is the popular pressure to reduce the extreme levels of urban air pollution
(Kahn, 2017). In that case, the policy would be additional once the costs of the scheme exceed the co-benefits.
However, it is usually rather difficult to measure and monetize the co-benefits. Moreover, personal experience of
one of the authors with the development of over a dozen Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in
developing countries between 2010 and 2018 shows that policymakers often do not believe in the actual gen-
eration of the co-benefits. We thus do not further pursue the approach of co-benefit testing of policies for addi-
tionality assessment.
6.2.1. Regulation
Regulation often addresses mitigation which in principle would be profitable for an entity (so-called economic
‘no-regret options’) but is not undertaken in the BAU situation due to incentive problems, such as the well-
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known ‘tenant – owner’ dilemma preventing efficiency improvements in buildings, or lack of information about
technology performance and failure risk. In contrast to that, carbon pricing aims to alter price ratios and thereby
mobilize mitigation that has costs under current market conditions and thus would not be undertaken under
BAU even in the absence of information or incentive problems. As far as a country benefits from the mobilization
of ‘no-regret options’ through the removal of incentive-related barriers, such regulatory instruments should in
our view not be deemed additional unless real barriers are demonstrated, e.g. access to finance in a particular
foreign currency. In cases of regulation that mandates a certain efficiency of a technology, a pragmatic approach
would, for example, be to assess the payback period that would lead to investment into that technology.
Academic literature (e.g. Jacobsen & Anderberg, 2005; Liu & Gao, 2016) and industry practice agree that 4–5
years – i.e. an internal rate of return of around 20% per year – would be a typical threshold. While this rate of
return is way above interest rates on capital markets, industries apply these high rates due to perceptions of risk.
Experience with regulation in industrialized countries shows that opposition by industrial lobby groups is rela-
tively low if regulation harnesses ‘no-regret options’ but increases steeply if going further (Mathys & de Melo,
2011; Michaelowa, 1998c). We thus propose to introduce a payback period threshold for additionality testing
of regulation. In order to increase ambition, the payback period threshold could be lengthened over time, imply-
ing more stringent regulatory pressure. It could also be made dependent on regulations practiced in countries of
a comparable level of development. Eventually, the threshold could be equivalent to that defined by capital
market interest rates.
6.2.2. Carbon pricing
Instruments that generate an explicit or implicit carbon price are diverse, ranging from ETS and offset schemes
to carbon taxes. Usually, the stringency of the system is reflected by the price level. However, systems can still
have positive prices even if there is no immediate scarcity as shown in the EU ETS when banking of units into the
future is allowed.
While carbon pricing schemes can be designed in a way to fully ‘recycle’ revenues, they will mobilize opposi-
tion by those entities that have to pay the carbon price. This is especially the case when the price cannot be
‘dodged’ as in the context of a carbon tax without exemptions. Thus, historically it has been difficult to introduce
carbon taxes that cover the entire economy (see Bruvoll & Larsen, 2004 for Norway). Even in rich and progressive
countries like Sweden, it took more than a decade after the introduction of the carbon tax to expand its cover-
age to industry. In all countries, the initial level of the carbon tax universally was low and could only be increased
in steps over time (OECD, 2018).
Similarly, emission trading systems often do not have very stringent caps, which corresponds with a relatively
low price level. Almost all current ETS have been overallocated (Hanoteau, 2014; Hermwille, Obergassel, & Arens,
2015; Narassimhan, Gallagher, Koester, & Rivera Alejo, 2018).
We therefore assume that lobbying against a carbon pricing system is proportional to the price level. On this
basis we propose a price-threshold system for additionality testing: carbon pricing is not additional in a given
country/sector if the average price over more than a year lies below X €/t CO2. In order to account for national
circumstances, in particularly different stages of development, differentiated price thresholds could be deter-
mined instead of applying a uniform price threshold across the globe. These thresholds would have to be nego-
tiated and determined at the international level.
But at what level should these thresholds be set? Historical experience shows that carbon prices of up to 10
€/t CO2 are politically feasible even in emerging economies such as China (ETS), India (coal tax), Chile, Mexico
and South Africa (carbon tax) (see price/tax levels in World Bank, 2018; most prices are close to 5 €). Political
opposition gets stiff at prices above 15 €/t CO2 as seen in Australia and the EU; no emerging economy
system has a carbon price at that level. Taking this experience as a reference point, carbon pricing thresholds
of at least 5 €/t CO2 for developing countries and 10 €/t CO2 for developed countries could be warranted.
However, as discussed above, current practices cannot be considered as an adequate reference point if we
take the 1.5°C goal seriously. Price thresholds would have to be significantly higher and, most importantly,
increase over time.
Many stakeholders propose that Article 6.2 should allow generation of ITMOs through linking of ETS. Given
the proliferation of overallocated ETS, we propose that for ETS regardless of their price a further test of the initial
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allocation is undertaken. ETS with an overallocation would not be seen as additional and could not generate
ITMOs.
6.2.3. Direct financial support
Instruments for direct financial support, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy or grants for low-carbon
investment, are easier to implement than carbon pricing schemes for political economy reasons (Michaelowa,
1998b). Subsidies usually benefit a very specific group of actors that lobbies for the introduction of the subsidies.
Historic experiences show interdependency of large-scale mitigation subsidies and sufficiently strong lobby
groups on the part of mitigation technology producers. The cases of wind and solar energy in Denmark,
Germany (see Michaelowa, 2005 for wind) and Spain are typical.
A similar reasoning applies to grants or public budget allocations to large infrastructure projects where con-
struction lobbies benefit. Classically, investment costs for urban mass rapid transport systems are very high and
never justified by climate change mitigation alone (Gruetter, 2007).
Direct financial support instruments can have very different designs so it is not easy to choose a clear indi-
cator for their additionality. A starting point may be to calculate an implicit carbon price and then apply the
thresholds defined in the section on carbon pricing above.
7. Conclusions and recommendations
Ensuring that only activities that are truly additional to the host countries’ contributions are approved under
Article 6 is key to ensuring the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement. In theory, the host countries
should have an incentive not to export non-additional reductions. In practice, many countries’ NDCs contain
‘hot air’; these countries therefore may not care whether or not activities on their territory are additional, as illus-
trated by the history of JI.
We therefore recommend that activity-level additionality testing can only be waived if the host country
agrees to an independent assessment of its NDC and this assessment finds that the NDC does not contain
‘hot air’. If these two conditions are not fulfilled, we recommend specific additionality testing for all activities.
The same is the case for activities not covered by the seller’s NDC.
If activity-level additionality testing is required, we recommend that additionality testing should be tailored
to the type of activity that is proposed. We suggest that ITMOs/emission credits can be generated provided:
(a) Projects pass an investment test with standardized input criteria, comparable to the checking of a loan
application by a financial institution.
(b) Programmes pass an investment test (as defined in the preceding criterion) for a typical activity under the
programme. In case of significant changes of input criteria over time, the investment test needs to be
repeated.
(c) Payback periods for regulation-driven technologies exceed a pre-defined threshold level. The threshold
level initially could reflect standard industry practice but be strengthened over time to converge
towards capital market interest rates.
(d) Carbon pricing schemes generate a price exceeding predefined thresholds over a certain period of time.
Thresholds should be differentiated according to country groups and rise over time.
(e) ‘Cap and trade’ systems are not overallocated.
Notes
1. This led to an acrimonious debate, with Cames et al. (2016) and He and Morse (2013) arguing that the majority of renewable
energy projects under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism were not additional due to their high economic
attractiveness. However, that attractiveness was mainly due to the incentives provided by new national mitigation policies.
Interestingly, regulatory policies mandating certain technologies like landfill gas collection always had to be considered in
additionality testing as long as they were generally enforced.
2. ‘Hot air’ is generated when a national emission target is less stringent than the real BAU path. The easiest way to ‘produce’ ‘hot
air’ is an overestimate of the BAU. A simple example: A country with 2015 emissions of 50 million t CO2e claims that BAU
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emissions for 2030 are 100 million t CO2e, and then defines an NDC target of 80 million t CO2e. However, the real BAU for 2030
is just 70 million t CO2e. In 2030, the country thus creates 10 million t CO2e of ‘hot air’. Russia and Ukraine had Kyoto targets of
0% reduction, while the BAU path was about 40 and 60% below 1990 levels in the 2000s, respectively (Kollmuss et al., 2015).
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